Client Advisory

In a unanimous decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the evidentiary record was insufficient to establish the minimum contacts required to authorize a New Jersey court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the Archdiocese of Philadelphia for alleged sexual abuse that occurred during an overnight trip to a private home in New Jersey.

Plaintiff commenced a lawsuit under the New Jersey Child Victims Act alleging that the defendant priest (priest) sexually abused him during an overnight trip to a private home in New Jersey. The priest was assigned by the Archdiocese of Philadelphia to a Pennsylvania parish. The Archdiocese maintained its principal office in Philadelphia and operated parishes, schools, and other facilities in five counties located in Pennsylvania. Discovery revealed that the Archdiocese previously owned property in New Jersey, but that it no longer owns property, nor conducts business in New Jersey. A witness for the Archdiocese testified that priests in the Archdiocese are supervised by the Archbishop of Philadelphia and that priests have sometimes accompanied parishioners traveling outside of the geographical boundaries of the Archdiocese. The priest testified that his family vacationed in Margate, New Jersey where his family owned two residences. and where the alleged abuse occurred.

Plaintiff did not argue as a basis for personal jurisdiction that the Archdiocese knew that the priest had taken him to New Jersey. Rather, he argued that the Archdiocese enabled the defendant priest to take plaintiff to New Jersey and sexually assault him by conferring the status of priest upon him, a status that allegedly played a large role in plaintiff’s mother granting permission for plaintiff to go on the trip. Plaintiff additionally argued that the priest was an agent of the Archdiocese by virtue of its authority over the priest’s work.

The Trial court held that the Archdiocese’s past ownership of property in New Jersey was not sufficient to authorize personal jurisdiction in that the Archdiocese had not purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in New Jersey by owning property. The Appellate Division similarly found that the Archdiocese’s former ownership of properties in New Jersey did not have any relation to plaintiff’s allegation of abuse by the defendant priest. The Appellate Division further held that the defendant priest was not acting within the scope of his responsibilities as a priest when he sexually assaulted plaintiff, thereby rejecting personal jurisdiction based on an agency theory that the Archdiocese employed and controlled the priest.

The Court agreed with the trial court and the Appellate Division that the record does not support findings that the Archdiocese purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in New Jersey and that the action arose from or relates to the Archdiocese’s contacts with New Jersey. The Court rejected plaintiff’s theory that the defendant’s status as a priest facilitated his sexual assault and that the Archdiocese’s authority over the priest’s work rendered the priest an agent of the Archdiocese when he traveled to New Jersey, thus subjecting the Archdiocese to personal jurisdiction. The Court held that agency principles governing the question of a principal’s liability for the acts of an agent do not displace the minimum contacts due process analysis in a personal jurisdiction inquiry of whether the Archdiocese purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in New Jersey, and whether the claims arose from or related to the Archdiocese’s contacts with new Jersey. The Court held that the Archdiocese’s oversight of the defendant priest did not establish the requisite nexus with New Jersey.